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A B S T R A C T
Usually the improvements of human performance in the course of ship design process is carried out by
modifying local ergonomics, like electronic visualisation and information display systems on the bridge or in the
engine control room, stair or hatch covers design. However, the eﬀect of global design factors (GDFs), such as
ship motion, whole body vibration and noise, on human performance has not been given attention before. Such
knowledge would allow the improvements of human performance by eﬀective design modiﬁcation on very early
stage of ship design process.
Therefore, in this paper we introduce probabilistic models linking the eﬀect of GDFs with the human
performance suitable for ship design process. As a theoretical basis for modelling human performance the
concept of Attention Management is utilized, which combines the theories described by Dynamic Adaptability
Model, Cognitive Control Model and Malleable Attentional Resources Theory.
Since the analysed ﬁeld is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, we adopt a speciﬁc modelling
technique along with a validation framework that allows uncertainty treatment and helps the potential end-
users to gain conﬁdence in the models and the results that they yield. The proposed models are developed with
the use Bayesian Belief Networks, which allows systematic translation of the available background knowledge
into a coherent network and the uncertainty assessment and treatment.
The obtained results are promising as the models are responsive to changes in the GDF nodes as expected.
The models may be used as intended by naval architects and vessel designers, to facilitate risk-based ship
design.
1. Introduction
Reduced human performance is reported as one of major factors
contributing to the maritime accidents, [1–4]. In the recent years the
studies related to the quantiﬁcation of human performance for various
shipborne operations have been gaining an increasing attention,
resulting in a number of models and approaches, see for example [5–
8] . At the same time, signiﬁcant eﬀorts have been made to study and
implement local design modiﬁcations of ships improving the ergo-
nomics thus human performance on board a ship and ultimately ship
safety, [9–13].
A major recent advance in the ﬁeld of maritime safety is the
development of risk-based ship design methodology (RBSD), resulting
in development of larger and potentially safer ships, [14,15]. Within
RSBD the assessment of the risk level with respect to predeﬁned types
of accidents is conducted in the early design stage, where a design
modiﬁcation is easy and cost-eﬀective and risk is treated as a design
objective, [12]. In risk analysis two aspects of the analysed accident are
covered, its likelihood (accident prevention) and the anticipated
consequences (accident mitigation). The latter is addressed by improv-
ing technical and structural reliability of a ship and it has been
extensively studied over past years, [16–20]. The former is addressed
usually by improving performance of a human, however the research
on the eﬀect of the overall ship design on human performance is in its
infancy, [21–24], despite its relevance to the ﬁeld of ship design, [25].
Such a method could be incorporated into the RBSD, improving human
performance through modiﬁcation of appropriate global design factors
(GDFs), thus reducing the risk of accidents already at the early design
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stage.
However, the possible risk reduction remains unknown until now,
since the common human error quantiﬁcation frameworks do not
readily account for the speciﬁc eﬀect of the GDFs.
Therefore, this paper presents advances, focusing on modelling the
eﬀect of GDFs on human performance which is measured with the
probability of ship-ship collision and ship grounding, which in turn is a
recognized proxy for risk in the RBSD process and can easily be
incorporated therein.
As a results of extensive literature survey on the eﬀects of human
exposure to the following three GDFs: ship motion, noise and vibra-
tion see [24–26] a workable approach has emerged for modelling
human performance focussing on attention management, which is
found suitable for the given purpose. It is based on three theories: the
Dynamic Adaptability Model, [29] Cognitive Control Model [30] and
Malleable Attentional Resources Theory [31].
These foundations are used as a guide for constructing two models
presented here, which are developed using Bayesian Belief Networks
(BBNs). BBNs is capable of representing background knowledge about
the analysed accidents, the evaluation of associated uncertainties,
eﬃcient reasoning and updating in light of new evidence, see for
example [6,32–37].
Finally the models are validated adopting a framework as proposed
by [38], which is found suitable for a given purpose, [39]. The
framework allows for rigorous checks of the models along with the
evaluation of uncertainty. As result, the models are found to behave in
response to GDF inputs as intended, and the obtained results are found
valid for a given purpose. The models can oﬀer a valid comparative
assessment of ship designs with respect to human performance, which
is their primary intention.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
introduces the modelling framework, upon which the human perfor-
mance models are developed. The models development process is
presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the validation of the models
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Structure of the models
The aim of the presented models is two-fold. First they quantify the
human performance in the presence of motion, noise and whole body
vibration that are speciﬁc for each ship designs. Second they allow
diﬀerentiation of various ship designs with respect to the human
performance.
In this section we introduce a modelling framework adopted here
that ﬁts requirements of RBSD and recommendations by IMO regard-
ing human performance modelling in maritime [40]. Subsequently the
causal pathway linking the GDFs with human performance is de-
scribed.
2.1. Modelling framework
To develop the models we adopt a generic modelling framework by
Fig. 1. A modelling framework adopted for human performance evaluation subjected to GDFs, suitable for risk-informed ship design.
Nomenclature
AMC Attention Management Capability
AH Alternative Hypothesis
BBN Bayesian Belief Networks
CCM Cognitive Control Model
DAAct a triplet of Detection, Assessment, Action
APOA Assessed Proportion of Aﬀect
DAM Dynamic Adaptability Model
EPC Error Producing Conditions
GDFs Global Design Factors (noise, whole body vibration,
motion)
GTT Generic Task Type
HEP Human Error Probability
HRA Human Reliability Assessment
MART Malleable Attentional Resources Theory
MII Motion Induced Interruptions
MIS Motion Induced Sickness
NARA Nuclear Action Reliability Assessment
OOW Oﬃcer Of the Watch
RBSD Risk-Based Ship Design
SCT Safety Critical Tasks
WBV Whole Body Vibration
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[41], with modiﬁcation, as depicted in Fig. 1. The framework aims to:
• integrate in systematic way the available background knowledge on
the subject of the analysis,
• provide sound basis for the procedure of human performance
assessment subjected to GDFs
• account for the existing uncertainty by determining its bound for the
models,
• validate the developed probabilistic models,
• facilitate the decision making process.
The relevant data, theories, models and expert's judgment is
obtained and gathered into a workable model, mimicking the described
phenomenon. Since the level of available background knowledge
signiﬁcantly varies across the models, the modelling choice has to
reﬂect on that, being able to:
• account for the uncertainty,
• propagate it through the model,
• infer in the presence of uncertainty,
Considering the above, we use probabilistic casual models, aka.
Bayesian Belief Networks, as a modelling technique. BBNs is recog-
nized tool for reasoning under uncertainty, linking various types of
data into one whole for the wide uncertainty assessment and treatment.
Within the BBNs the uncertainty is measured through the probabilities,
and propagated through the model with the use of Bayesian Theory.
The inherent feature of BBNs, two-ways reasoning, allows not only
forward propagation of the evidences resulting in an outcome, but it is
also possible to propagate backwards the evidences to estimate the
most probable input variables, given a selected state of the output. The
high-level modelling framework adopted here is depicted in Fig. 1 and
elaborated in the following sections.
2.2. Linking the eﬀects of GDFs with human performance
To describe the process through which exposure to GDFs causally
aﬀects the performance of a crew member in relation to speciﬁc
operations (collision avoidance, grounding avoidance, tasks related to
maintenance of ship technical systems) a causal pathway was devel-
oped through the mediating agent of the crewmember. The process
serves to do three things:
1. Represent the mechanism by which GDFs exposure impacts human
performance in operations.
2. Describe the overall topography of the ﬁnal model.
3. Facilitate the identiﬁcation of nodes.
GDFs can be considered a type of performance shaping factors
(PSF), where PSFs are an aspect of the human's individual character-
istics, environment, organisation, or task that speciﬁcally decrements
or improves human performance, thus increasing or decreasing the
likelihood of human error respectively, [42]. While there are many
other PSFs that can aﬀect human behaviour – for instance training,
experience, competence, time available, workload, job design, man-
ning, ergonomics of the equipment and procedures - these are excluded
from the models as they are not aﬀected by exposure to GDFs. All the
excluded PSFs are implicitly assumed to remain constant within the
model.
Other potentially relevant factors, which are not considered, are the
long terms eﬀects of GDFs on the crew performance. For example, we
do not consider the hearing loss due to long-term noise exposure either
individually or in combination with other GDFs eﬀects. In practical
terms only the eﬀect of GDFs-aﬀected human performance on the
possible occurrence of collision and grounding in combination with the
safety critical task (SCT) being performed are considered.
In the models the inputs and outputs are predetermined. The GDFs
form the three inputs: ship motion, noise and whole body vibration
(WBV). The unwanted outcomes form an output: the probability of an
accident. The latter is chosen as a measure of human performance in
SCT related to accident avoidance; since it is commonly accepted and
widely used metric in the maritime domain thus it could be easily
implemented in the RBSD process.
In reality, crew exposure to GDFs is likely to result in a plethora of
eﬀects on human performance and subsequent outcomes. However, to
remain within the scope of our study the causal representation is
limited to describing only those mechanisms that can describe the
relationships between the predetermined inputs and outputs, as
depicted in Fig. 2.
Two main paths linking GDFs exposure to human behaviour have
been identiﬁed:
• Path 1: Stressor eﬀects. Exposure to a GDF acts as a stressor and can
aﬀect the perceptual, cognitive and physical capabilities of an
individual (e.g. attention management), which can subsequently
impair the performance of the individual (i.e. the actual behaviour
produced).
• Path 2: Physical eﬀects. Exposure to a GDF can have speciﬁc and
direct eﬀects on the behaviour produced. For example, Ship motion
can result in Motion-Induced Interruptions (MII). MII does not
aﬀect the underlying human capabilities of balance or ﬁne motor
control, but it exceeds the ability of the human to compensate and
produce the intended behaviour. Similarly, WBV can directly impact
the actual behaviour produced.
These two paths show how GDFs exposure aﬀects human beha-
viour, which in turn inﬂuences the performance of SCT. It is the
outcomes of an individual's actions and behaviour that determine the
success or failure of a SCT. Insuﬃcient performance of the SCT creates
an antecedent for the unwanted outcome. The SCT are associated with:
• Maintaining safe vessel navigation thus avoiding collision or
grounding.
• Proper maintenance of technical equipment of a ship, required for
performing accident evasive action.
However, insuﬃcient task performance alone does not determine
Fig. 2. A causal chain describing the relationship between crew, GDF exposure and
unwanted outcomes, [43].
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whether or not a collision or grounding occurs; the vessel must also be
exposed to the collision or grounding hazard, as follows:
• For a collision to occur, another vessel must be on a collision course.
• For a grounding to occur, the ship must be in shallow water.
This causal mechanism makes the following assumptions:
• While we recognise that individuals have diﬀering cognitive and
physical abilities, it is assumed that all individuals have the same
basic set of capabilities (i.e. all individuals can manage their
attention, irrespective of the extent of this capability).
• Human behaviour is inﬂuenced by diﬀuse and acute eﬀects of GDFs
exposure as represented by the paths in Fig. 2.
• The crew perform SCT related to collision and grounding and tasks
are appropriate, processes and procedures are optimised, and are
undertaken by a competent operator.
• SCT must be performed correctly to maintain safe vessel operation.
• In case of bridge team the SCT manage the exposure of the vessel to
the collision and grounding hazard.
• In case of engine room team the SCT manage the ability of a
technical systems of a vessel to respond as requested by the bridge
team.
• While it is recognized that interaction eﬀects between GDFs within
each pathway are likely to exist, these are excluded from the models,
as the literature does not provide any information describing this
interaction. For the review of the relevant literature the reader is
referred to our earlier work [26,27].
3. Models development
3.1. Background knowledge related to human performance aﬀected
by the GDFs
It was found that the data on the speciﬁc GDF eﬀects of ship motion
(with the exception of motion induced interruption MII), noise, WBV
on human performance are sparse and in many, but not all, cases
generated under very speciﬁc, often non-marine, conditions. Data
shows that there is certainly evidence for GDFs having some eﬀect
on human performance. However, the direct eﬀects of GDF exposure
on human performance tend to be weak, whereas secondary eﬀects
acting through another mechanism (e.g. fatigue, Motion Induced
Sickness - MIS) tend to be stronger and more pervasive, [44,45].
Speciﬁcally, there are some data that describe the:
• Impact of GDFs on speciﬁc human capabilities, [46].
• Impact of GDFs on speciﬁc human behaviours, [47].
• Impact of errors on task performance, [48].
However, there is very little data about the link between the
following components:
• Degraded human capabilities and collision or grounding related
performance.
• Degraded task performance and exposure to the collision/grounding
hazard
Fig. 3 demonstrates the links in the causal chain for which some
quantitative data are available (in green) and the links for which there
is no data (in red). For a summary of available literature the reader is
referred to our earlier work, [27]. In addition to this gap, a given level
of exposure to GDFs of certain intensity or duration may not aﬀect all
individuals equally. For example, while a given frequency and ampli-
tude of ship motion may be generally MIS-inducing, individual
experiences may range from signiﬁcant nausea to no negative aﬀects
whatsoever, depending on their underlying susceptibility to MIS and
the degree to which they have acclimatized. Moreover, with the possible
exception of secondary eﬀects on human performance caused by
fatigue, attributable to sleep disruption, a holistic view could not
readily be derived directly from the individual ﬁndings. As such, the
relevant theoretical models available in the scientiﬁc literature guided
our approach.
The approach taken here to describe a mechanism that accounts for
the impact of stressors on human performance has been based on the
principles of attention management. It combines the principles from
three theoretical models:
• Dynamic Adaptability Model (DAM), [29].
• Cognitive Control Model (CCM), [30].
• Malleable Attentional Resources Theory (MART), [31].
Under the DAM paradigm, GDFs are seen as types of physical
stressor that aﬀect human capabilities associated with maintaining a
desired level of task performance either directly or indirectly (e.g. via
fatigue). When exposed to GDFs, CCM describes humans compensat-
ing through the eﬀortful direction of more cognitive resources at the
task, typically at the cost of performance in other areas. Despite the
sophisticated, and potentially subconscious, strategies humans have at
their disposal, there is a limit to how much an individual can
compensate without experiencing degradation in primary or secondary
task performance. In addition, the extent to which human can
compensate for task demands is not ﬁxed. MART describes this
compensatory capability changing as a function of task demands and
associated arousal an individual experiences – attentional resources
available vary as a function of load. When humans are in a state of
under-load (i.e. bored) their pool of attentional resources is relatively
small and will increase proportionately with the demands placed on
them. However, there is a limit to how much the pool of attentional
resources can grow. When task demands exceed the pool of attentional
resources available (either transiently or when the upper attentional
resource limit is exceeded), performance can breakdown and errors
may be made.
Generally, task performance is only expected to degrade and
become insuﬃcient when compensatory mechanisms have failed.
However, the literature does not allow prediction of how and when
(chronologically) an operator would fail, under what conditions of GDF
exposure, and what the speciﬁc eﬀect on behaviour (i.e. type of error)
would be.
In the models presented here, the main element is the performance
of the SCT by engineers and a bridge team. The SCT of the engine team
Fig. 3. Supporting data for links in the causal chain, [43].
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is to maintain the ship systems, ensuring that they function properly
when needed. This is a simpliﬁed description of the eﬀect of GDFs on
technical failure, through the mediating agent of crewmember. The
SCT of the bridge team is to perform tasks associated with an accident
evasive action. These tasks are complex and distributed in time, thus
can be decomposed into three major phases, [5]: detection (D),
assessment (A), action (Act). These three phases (DAAct) reﬂect the
basic cognitive functions of observation, interpretation and planning,
and execution, [49,50].
The performance of various tasks is governed by attention manage-
ment, which is the supervisory human capability that directs, allocates
and regulates the attentional resources required for the tasks. This
high-level supervisory capability manages lower-level tasks such as
perception, cognition, decision-making, memory, ﬁne motor control
and locomotion.
To evaluate the eﬀect of GDF exposure on human performance the
approach based on attention management theory is taken. Therein the
eﬀect of GDFs is represented as a stressor that sits either above or
below the threshold of attentional capacity for any given SCT. If the
stressor exceeds the attentional capacity then the attention manage-
ment is degraded, whereas no negative eﬀect is expected if the stressor
can be managed within the available attentional capacity.
Representing ship motion, noise and WBV GDFs as stressors
interacting with an individual's attention management capabilities
provides an evidence-based mechanism for human performance that
has been used to develop the models presented here.
3.2. Aggregation of the background knowledge into a model
The GDFs may have either an acute or diﬀuse eﬀect. In case of an
acute eﬀect, the threshold refers to the GDFs level at which an
individual may be unable to physically compensate for GDF exposure
and perform actions as intended. In case of diﬀuse eﬀect, the threshold
refers to the amount of motion, vibration or noise an individual can
endure before it acts as a stressor (with a corresponding stress
response). The exact value of the threshold will vary between indivi-
duals and it is dependent upon previous experience, exposure duration
and sensitivity. If the thresholds are not exceeded, then the attention of
a crew-member is not aﬀected, otherwise the attention management
capability is degraded. It is not yet known what underlying psycholo-
gical factors set an individual's baseline tolerance to GDF exposure. In
reality, the overall impact of stressor exposure is likely to be deter-
mined by an individual's personal threshold for feeling the eﬀects of
stressor exposure, and the eﬀectiveness of the strategies they adopt for
managing mental resources to preserve task performance (e.g. task
prioritisation and shedding).
Representing GDF exposure eﬀects on safety behaviour via the
attention management path provides a structure compatible with the
introduction of an Error Producing Conditions (EPC) using the method
called NARA,1 which belongs to the latest (third) generation of the
human reliability assessment (HRA) methods, and pertains to the
nuclear ﬁeld, [51].
The models begin with the discretization of the GDFs into the
classes, which reﬂect the available background knowledge in the ﬁeld.
For the review of the eﬀects of GDFs on humans, the reader is referred
to earlier work, [27,28]. Based on that discretization, a type of an eﬀect
that the GDF has on a crewmember is determined, namely diﬀuse or
acute along with the thresholds.
The diﬀuse eﬀect of motion, vibration and noise, as well as the acute
eﬀect of the later is directly aﬀecting the human capabilities of a bridge
crew and the engine team, described by the concept of attention
management. The latter if reduced, increases the probability of human
error while performing a given type of SCT. If the attention manage-
ment remains unaﬀected, the probability of error stays at its baseline
level, as obtained from NARA.
Acute eﬀects of all GDFs but noise don’t aﬀect attention manage-
ment capability (AMC), but they directly degrade the physical ability of
a crewmember. However, in case of the engine team, this eﬀect is not
anticipated, since we assume that the preventive maintenance on ships
systems is not carried out if the levels of GDFs are above thresholds.
This is in line with most of the operations guidelines of ships, where
crews abstain from certain tasks if the weather conditions do not allow
for safe performance of these tasks.
The probability of an error while performing SCT by the bridge
team (detecting, assessing and acting along with communicating within
the bridge team) together with the probability of technical failure, due
to erroneous maintenance of critical ship systems by the engine team,
yields the probability of not making proper and eﬀective evasive action
while on a course leading to an accident.
If the other ship on the collision course does not take appropriate
action either, the collision is inevitable. In case of grounding accident,
the lack of action from the ship on a grounding course results in the
accident.
The models are presented in Figs. 4 and 5, and elaborated in details
in the following sections.
3.3. Quantiﬁcation of the GDFs and their eﬀect on human capabilities
In the presented models the variables associated with the GDFs are
as follows:
• noise (dB),
• vibrations (Hz),
• motion expressed by the accelerations in horizontal and vertical
planes (in RMS g), as well the frequency of vertical motion (in Hz).
The variables are discretised according to the best available back-
ground knowledge, summarised in earlier work see [27,28], to reﬂect
various eﬀects that the GDFs alone, or with combination, may have on
a person.
In the models presented here we assign the equal a priori
probabilities for the states of GDFs. However, if the models are used
to quantify the human performance associated with a speciﬁc ship
design, these probabilities are updated accordingly to reﬂect the
anticipated behaviour of the designs under evaluation. The discretiza-
tion and a’priori probabilities for the GDFs are gathered in tables
presented in Appendix A (Tables A8–A12).
In the models the GDFs aﬀect a person in a binary manner, either
they act as a stressor, which degrades the human capability thus human
performance, or they do not have any eﬀect whatsoever. For the GDFs
to become an active stressor their values need to be above threshold.
The probabilities of GDFs sitting below or above a threshold, given set
of GDFs, are evaluated by the conditional probability tables presented
in the Appendix A (Tables A13–A20). For the summary of relevant
background knowledge adopted to develop these tables see [27,28].
The quantiﬁcation of the eﬀect of GDFs stressors on the capabilities
of human, through the concept of the AMC, is presented in Table 1. If
the stressors are active (the GDF sits above the threshold), the AMC is
degraded with the probability of 1. The analogical assumption is made
for the situation where the stressors are inactive.
3.4. Quantiﬁcation of the human behaviour in the presence of GDFs
3.4.1. Detection, assessment and action
Based on the earlier research, [5,49,50], and rational thought a
1 In recent years, the limitations and shortcomings of the second generation HRA
methods have led to further developments related to the improvement of pre-existing
methods. The only method now deﬁned as third generation is nuclear action reliability
assessment (NARA) and is, in fact, an advanced version of HEART for the nuclear ﬁeld.
The shortcomings in the second generation, have been the starting point of HRA experts
for new research and improvement of existing methods, [80].
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sequence of SCT related to accident avoidance can be broken down into
three major phases: detection, assessment, action (DAAct). These are
linked with the basic cognitive functions of human such as observation,
interpretation and planning, and execution. In the models presented
here the performance of a human with respect to these functions is
modelled with the use of NARA guidelines and the generic task types
(GTT) that it oﬀers. To limit the complexity of the models, a single GTT
was sought to represent all relevant navigational tasks performed by
the OOW that are important in executing collision avoidance and
GDFs and their effects on bridge 
personell 
GDFs and their effects on 
engine personnel 
Human capabilities 
Hazard exposure 
Human behaviour while performing 
safety critical tasks 
Safety critical task 
performance 
Fig. 4. A model for ship-ship collision accounting for the eﬀect of GDFs.
GDFs and their effects on bridge 
personell 
GDFs and their effects on 
engine personnel 
Human capabilities Human behaviour while performing safety 
critical tasks 
Safety critical task 
performance 
Fig. 5. A model for ship grounding accounting for the eﬀect of GDFs.
Table 1
Probability table of the node Attention Management Capability and Attention Manage-
ment Capability 2 (Parent node for the former GDF stressor and for the latter GDF
stressor technical).
Attention Management Capability - AMC Probability
GDF stressor Active Inactive
Normal 0 1
Degraded 1 0
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navigation in shallow waters. The GTT that is most analogous is, [51]:
Task C1 – Simple response to alarms/indications providing clear
indication of situation (Simple diagnosis required) Response might
be direct execution of simple actions or initiating other actions
separately assessed. (Nominal HEP =0.0005)
This task refers to the triplet DAAct, and it determines whether or
not the SCT of detection, assessment and actions is performed – which
implies that it is also suﬃcient. This is an all-encompassing deﬁnition
including whatever tasks are required to maintain situational aware-
ness and to respond appropriately to avoid collision or grounding. The
probability of not performing DAAct is calculated based on the
integration of three nodes: Helmsman present, GDF Physical Eﬀect
and Attention Management Capability (AMC), as shown in Table B21
and depicted in Fig. 4.
In the case of not degraded AMC (AMC=z1) and the absence of
helmsman (H=h0) we assume very weak physical eﬀect of the GDFs
(PE=x1) on not performing the DAAct (DAAct=θ0), as follows:
p DAAct θ H h AMC z PE x( = |( = , = , = )) = 0. 001,0 0 1 1 (1)
However, this eﬀect is represented as being more signiﬁcant in
combination with a degraded AMC (AMC=z0), as follows:
p DAAct θ H h AMC z PE x( = |( = , = , = )) = 0. 0011,0 0 0 1 (2)
Thus representing an additional drain on cognitive resources
compensating for physical task disruption. These values were estimated
using judgement. To set the probability of not performing DAAct when
a person is not aﬀected by GDF exposure (PE=x0), to reﬂect a baseline
error rate, the NARA GTT value for Task C1 of 0.0005 is used, as
follows:
p DAAct θ H h AMC z PE x( = |( = , = , = )) = 0. 0005,0 0 1 0 (3)
NARA categorises the factors that negatively inﬂuence human
performance as one of eighteen Error Producing Conditions (EPCs),
see Table B28. The EPC that best represented the causal mechanism
from GDFs exposure to human performance was EPC No. 15 ‘Poor
Environment’. This EPC represents the stressor eﬀect of GDF exposure
on attention management capability. The potential strength of eﬀect of
this EPC was set using the Assessed Proportion of Aﬀect (APOA)
variable. The APOA level was set based on the application of the NARA
methodology to subjectively determine an appropriate value, nominally
between 0 (no eﬀect) and 1 (maximum eﬀect). However, based on the
guidance available for NARA, it was decided to cap the maximum
APOA associated with the EPC to 0.1.
Then using NARA guidelines, given exposure to error producing
conditions (EPC) No. 15, the probability of human error (HEP) in the
above mentioned situation of 0.0006 is calculated, see Table B21. This
HEP corresponds to the probability of not performing DAAct, as
follows:
p DAAct θ H h AMC z PE x( = |( = , = , = )) = 0. 0006,0 0 0 0 (4)
The NARA calculation allows inclusion of multiple EPCs and an
Extended Time Factor (ETF). In the models presented here GDFs are
represented using only one EPC and there is little justiﬁcation to
include the ETF. Thus, the HEP is calculated based on the following
formula:
HEP GTT EPC APOA= ∙[( −1)∙( +1)] (5)
3.4.2. Verbal communication on safety critical data
If evasive manoeuvres are performed with the presence of helms-
man, which requires appropriate communication of information be-
tween the OOW and helmsman, the node D1 - verbal communication
of safety critical data is evaluated, as presented in Table B22. This
node determines whether or not the verbal communication of safety
critical data to the helmsman required to avoid accident is suﬃcient. It
relates to the NARA GTT No. D1 of the same name. This node is passed
to its descendant called Evasive Action, where it is used to quantify the
probability of this action diﬀerentiating between the situation where
the helmsman is present or not. The NARA GTT value for Task D1 of
0.006 is used to set the probability of insuﬃcient performance (D1=d0)
unaﬀected by GDF exposure (AMC=z1) to reﬂect a baseline error rate.
p D d AMC z DAAct θ( 1 = |( = , = )) = 0. 006,0 1 1 (6)
The HEP of 0.0072 was calculated using NARA given exposure to
EPC No. 15 representing the eﬀect of GDF exposure via AMC
(AMC=z0), reﬂecting the following situation:
p D d AMC z DAAct θ( 1 = |( = , = )) = 0. 0072,0 0 1 (7)
It is assumed that Verbal communication of safety critical data is
unaﬀected by the GDF Physical Eﬀect.
3.4.3. Evasive action
Evasive action is assessed in the node Evasive Action, as shown in
Table B23. It is assumed that if Detection, assessment and execution of
simple actions and Verbal communication of safety critical data,
where applicable, are performed then Evasive Action will be executed.
If the helmsman is present then the probability of not executing the
evasive action is capped at 0.0001, in line with the NARA Human
Performance Limiting Value for ‘Actions taken by a team of operators’.
3.4.4. Technical failure
Technical failure node quantiﬁes the probability of the relevant
systems not functioning as a result of lack of maintenance or poor
maintenance caused by the GDFs aﬀecting the AMC of a crewmember
responsible for the maintenance. This node was included in recognition
of the importance of maintenance in sustaining the functionality of
vessel equipment such that it performs as it is designed to. Errors
during maintenance on systems that provide the manoeuvring cap-
ability of the vessel can limit the vessel's response to control inputs
associated with evasive action, hence aﬀecting the probability of an
unwanted outcome. Technical failure node determines whether or not
maintenance actions performed on equipment that provides the
vessel's manoeuvring capability has been completed successfully, see
Table B24.
The probability of insuﬃcient Maintenance Task Performance
(MTP=m0) is calculated based on the Attention Management
Capability-2 node, which follows the principle presented in Table
A19. To set the probability of insuﬃcient Maintenance Task
Performance, unaﬀected by GDF exposure, to reﬂect a baseline error
rate, the NARA GTT value for Task C1 of 0.0005 is used, as follows:
p MTP m AMC z( = | 2 = ) = 0. 0005,0 1 (8)
The HEP of 0.0006 was calculated using NARA given exposure to
EPC No. 15, representing the eﬀect of GDF exposure via the Attention
Management Capability-2 node, as presented in Table B25.
p MTP m AMC z( = | 2 = ) = 0. 0006,0 0 (9)
The GDF Physical Eﬀect on the probability of insuﬃcient safety
behaviour is not anticipated. This comes from an assumption about
lack of preventive maintenance carried out if the levels of GDFs are
above thresholds. This is in line with most of the operations guidelines
of ships, where crews abstain from certain tasks if the weather
conditions do not allow for safe performance of these tasks.
3.4.5. Evasive action of another ship
Evasive action of another ship is a node, which accounts for the
behaviour of OOW on a ship that is encountered by the own vessel. The
probability for this node is assigned based on NARA calculations, and
subject to alternative hypothesis testing, as elaborated in Section 3.5.
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3.4.6. Failure of another oﬃcer of the watch
This node exists in the model quantifying the performance of a
navigator conducting SCT related to avoiding grounding accident. The
node reﬂects the team-work nature of bridge navigation, which is a
process, where dangerous situations are anticipated well before they
arise. In case of collisions the time horizon for such anticipation is
usually expressed in minutes,2 however in case of groundings it can be
in hours or even days. A navigator knowing the passage plan is aware of
any areas that are potentially dangerous, especially if the ship course is
not adjusted and a ship leaves the pre-planned and safe route, [52].
Moreover, before a new bridge watch commences the relieved oﬃcer
reports to the one who takes over all the anticipated course alterations
and dangers to navigation to be expected during his watch, thus
increasing his situational awareness, [53].
Such practice is recognized in the grounding model by the node
Failure of another oﬃcer on the watch. This node quantiﬁes the
probability that an oﬃcer leaving the bridge will not pass the relevant
information on anticipated hazardous waters to the oﬃcer taking over.
The probability for this node is assigned based on NARA calcula-
tions, and subject to alternative hypothesis testing, as elaborated in
Section 3.5.
3.4.7. An accident
The last nodes of the models quantify the probability of an accident,
namely collision and grounding, for a given set of GDFs. However, the
models do not look to estimate probability of accident per se. Instead
they take it as a well-understood measure of human performance, to
propose a way to reﬂect human performance positively, which can be
maximized in ship design phase. The logic behind the nodes is
presented in Tables B26 and B27.
3.5. Uncertainty assessment and treatment
The parameters of the models presented here are developed based
on certain amount of background knowledge, which by no means is
complete. This incompleteness is the primary source of uncertainty
associated with the models and their parameters, [54,55]. Some
elements of the model and their relations are characterised by larger
amount of information, knowledge and understanding, thus have lower
uncertainty, the others are known and/or understood less resulting in
larger uncertainty.
The uncertainty assessment together with the sensitivity analysis of
the models provides a valuable tool for screening the models for
important variables, which are both uncertain and the models are
sensitive to. By ranking the variables in the models by their impor-
tance, we deﬁne the set of variables aﬀecting the most the credibility of
the models. Finally, with respect to the variables, which are important,
the uncertainty treatment is applied, as described in the following
sections.
3.5.1. Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity-value approach presented by Coupé and van der Gaag
[56] is applied here. The purpose of a sensitivity analysis is to
investigate the eﬀect of changes in the assigned probabilities of the
network variables on the probabilities of a speciﬁc outcome variable. In
a one-way sensitivity analysis, every conditional and prior probability
in the network is varied in turn, keeping the others unchanged. Based
on the ﬁndings from the sensitivity analysis of the models, the
following can be concluded:
• The models are highly sensitive to the following parameters:
Maintenance Task Performance, C1 – Detection, Assessment and
execution of simple actions and D1 – verbal communication of
safety critical data.
• The models are moderately sensitive to Evasive action of another
ship and Helmsman present. However, the eﬀect that these para-
meters have on the output is signiﬁcantly lower than the eﬀects of
C1 and D1, as speciﬁed above.
• The remaining nodes have very low sensitivity values, meaning that
their eﬀects on the models outputs are rather minor.
3.5.2. Evidential uncertainty assessment
For the most sensitive model parameters the evidential uncertainty
assessment is carried out, and the results are presented in Table 2. To
rank the uncertainty we apply the following qualitative scoring system
as introduced in [57]:
3.5.2.1. Signiﬁcant uncertainty. All of the following conditions are
met:
• The phenomena involved are not well understood; models are non-
existent or known/believed to give poor predictions.
• The assumptions made represent strong simpliﬁcations.
• Data are not available, or are unreliable.
• There is lack of agreement/consensus among experts.
3.5.2.2. Minor uncertainty. All of the following conditions are met:
• The phenomena involved are well understood; the models used are
known to give predictions with the required accuracy.
• The assumptions made are seen as very reasonable.
• Much reliable data are available.
• There is broad agreement among experts.
Table 2
The qualitative assessment of evidential uncertainty for the models presented here, [58].
Model parameter Justiﬁcation for the evidential uncertainty score Evidential uncertainty
score
Maintenance Task Performance This node represents the performance of navigation tasks critical in collision or grounding
avoidance and provides a structure compatible with the introduction of a NARA GTT, potentially
affected by EPC No. 15 via ‘Attention Management Capability’ and GDF Physical effects
Moderate
C1 - Detection, Assessment and execution of
simple actions
D1 - verbal communication of safety
critical data
This node represents the communication of vessel manoeuvring instructions critical in collision or
grounding avoidance with a helmsman present and introduction of a NARA GTT, potentially
affected by EPC No. 15 via ‘Attention Management Capability’.
Moderate
Evasive action of another ship The node represents the performance of navigation tasks critical in accident avoidance on board
other ship. It is quantified based on NARA.
Moderate
Helmsman present At the moment this node is quantified fully based on judgement. However, more detailed
assessment is possible if needed, for instance by performing survey among shipping companies.
Moderate-Minor
2 In situations where two ships are approaching each other at parallel courses and very
low relative speed, the time to the closest point of approach (TCPA), can be expressed in
hours. This measure along with the closest distance between two ships encountering
(CPA) is an example of the operational measures of safety during sea passages. However
in most cases the time needed to solve potential collision encounters is not more than
tens of minutes.
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3.5.2.3. Moderate uncertainty. Conditions between those
characterising signiﬁcant and minor uncertainty, e.g.:
• The phenomena involved are well understood, but the models used
are considered simple/crude.
• Some reliable data are available.
Subsequently, by combining the results of sensitive and uncertainty
assessment, the parameter importance ranking is carried out, see
Table 3. Three parameters have high importance score, namely
Maintenance Task Performance, C1-Detection, Assessment and
Execution of Simple Action, D1 – verbal communication on safety
critical data. For those three elements the uncertainty treatment is
carried out as presented in the following section.
3.5.3. Uncertainty treatment
The uncertainty associated with the model parameters, which are
believed to be to some extent known, is expressed through the
probabilities. For example, the state of a speciﬁc GDF associated with
a given ship design, say noise, can be described by a probability density
function that reﬂects the anticipated variability of this parameter for
the given design across a set of operational conditions.
In a similar way we can judge the probability of a helmsman being
present during a critical situation. This probability can be based on the
analysis of shipborne operations and the way how the bridge watch is
organized and conducted, knowing that most of the day-time the bridge
is manned by one person only, and a watchman is present during night
shifts and when navigating in coastal waters.
However, the majority of the uncertainty in the models comes from
the limited knowledge related to human performance given the
presence of stressors (GDFs). Despite the extensive amount of data
that NARA is built upon, it is very diﬃcult to point to a given
probability as the probability of erroneous behaviour of a human in
certain situation.
The probability of human error (HEP) is estimated based on NARA
methodology, for a set of factors and conditions, as presented in
Table 4. However, our background knowledge on the link between
human capability and human behaviour is heavily limited, as depicted
in Fig. 3, and we are unable to gain new information at this point.
Acknowledging that fact, we have to select an appropriate way of
dealing with this type of uncertainty, trying to improve the model
performance and results communication, [59]. We do not expect
uncertainty reduction, since our limited knowledge will not improve,
but we would expect some bounds for the results to fall within. Since,
the NARA itself oﬀers the intervals for the probability to account for the
anticipated uncertainty; this seems to be a rational way out in our case.
There exist several approaches to the uncertainty treatment, see for
example [57,60–67]. One of those, suitable for the treatment of
epistemic uncertainty is the use of imprecise probabilities, in this case
the intervals, along with the alternative hypotheses testing (AHT),
[68,69].
The AHT, in principle does not reduce the uncertainty but helps to
determine its bounds, which is relevant for decision making process.
Even though the results obtained are not more accurate than the results
without using AHT, the calculated bounds provide a warning for a
decision-maker about the quality of a given parameter, which is
missing in case of point estimates. In our case, the AHT is performed
for the variables that score high in importance ranking. These are
associated with the performance of a human aﬀected by external
stressors. The human error probability (HEP) is calculated for a given
Generic Task Type (GTT) given set of stressors described by, so called,
Error Producing Conditions (EPC).
The probabilities of nominal HEP for a given GTT are deﬁned as
intervals, whereas the EPCs are chosen by the analysts. This provides
several combinations leading to several coexisting alternatives (AH1,
AH2…AHn). Due to lack of knowledge we cannot point to any specify
hypothesis to be true for the given case, however we believe that we can
judge their probabilities of occurrence, using subjective probabilities
(p(AH1)+p(AH2)+…+p(AHn)=1), [70,71]. By doing that we obtain a
set of HEPs rather than a single value HEP.
The background knowledge and the associated uncertainty are
propagated through the model, and the output is produced. The latter
is a two-state variable Z=(z1, z2), where z1=accident; z2=no_accident,
and the quantity of interest is the probability of the accident given the
set on input variables (X), as follows p(Z=z1|X).
Table 3
The qualitative assessment of model parameters importance for the models presented here [58].
Model parameter Evidential uncertainty score Sensitivity score Importance score
Maintenance Task Performance Moderate High High
C1 - Detection, Assessment and execution of simple actions Moderate High High
D1 - verbal communication of safety critical data Moderate High High
Evasive action of another ship Moderate Moderate Moderate
Helmsman present Moderate-Minor Moderate Moderate
Table 4
The lower and upper probabilities for the parameters obtained from NARA, [51].
GTT and nominal probability P(GTT) P(GTT) EPC1 APOA1 HEP HEP HEP
C1. 5E−4 3E−4 1E−2 15-Poor Environment 3 Low 0,1 6E−4 3.6E−4 1.2E−2
5E−4 3E−4 1E−2 15-Poor Environment 3 High (N/A) 0,8 1.3E−3
5E−4 3E−4 1E−2 N/A 0 NIL 0 5E−4
D1. 6E−3 3E−3 1E−2 15 - Poor Environment 3 Low 0,1 7.2E−3 3.6E−3 1.2E−2
6E−3 3E−3 1E−2 15 - Poor Environment 3 High (N/A) 1 1.8E−2
6E−3 3E−3 1E−2 N/A 0 NIL 0 6E−3 3E−3 1E−2
C1: Simple response to alarms/indications providing clear indication of situation (Simple diagnosis required) Response might be direct execution of simple actions or initiating other
actions separately assessed.
D1: Verbal communication of safety critical data.
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The following parameters of models need to be described with the
use of imprecise probabilities, characterised by the lower and upper
bounds:
1. C1 – Detection, assessment and execution of simple actions.
2. D1 – Verbal communication of safety critical data.
3. Maintenance task performance.
4. Technical failure.
5. Evasive action of another ship.
6. Failure of another oﬃcer of the watch.
All the items but 4 are based on the same paradigm and utilize the
same upper and lower bounds for factors speciﬁed by NARA. The item
4 provides the spectrum of failure probabilities for a technical system,
for normal and degraded maintenance regime, based on the historical
data and experts’ judgement. The values of the imprecise probabilities
adopted for the items 1–3 and 5–6 are gathered in Table 4. The
probability of evasive action of another ship and the failure of another
oﬃcer of the watch correspond to the probabilities of C1.
The probability of technical failure – item 4 – is estimated as an
interval - Δp(techn_failure), where the upper - p techfailure( )- and
lower – p technfailure( ) – probabilities are obtained from the litera-
ture,3 [72,73]. This interval describes the probability of technical
failure in normal operation, where the maintenance tasks are taken
properly (MTP=m1), as follows Δp(techn_failure|MTP=m1).
However, there is no evidence for the probability of technical failure
during erroneous maintenance, which results from the reduced human
performance. In such situation the following three interpretations,
referred to as alternative hypothesis (AH), may hold.
First it is intuitive to expect the probability of technical failure to
increase, compared to normal maintenance. The most straightforward
way to model that is to assume, that in case of improper maintenance
(MTP=m0) the probability of technical failure equals 1.
AH p techn failure MTP m1 : ( _ | = ) = 1,0 (10)
Second, in case of erroneous action, the redundancy of the system
may prevent technical failure to aﬀect the operations of the safety
critical systems, thus the probability of technical failure will remain the
same as in normal operations:
AH p techn failure MTP m p techn failure2 : ( _ | = ) = ∆ ( _ ),0 (11)
Third, in light of our limited knowledge on what will happen in case
of erroneous maintenance in terms of the availability of safety critical
technical systems of a ship, we can assume that both failure and lack of
it are equally likely:
AH p techn failure MTP m3 : ( _ | = ) = 0. 5,0 (12)
To account for three interpretations, we consider each of these as an
alternative hypothesis and we assign a weight to each, corresponding to
our belief on a given variable becoming true. At the moment there is no
support for giving preference to any of these, we assign equal weights
for the hypothesis, on the probability of technical failure given
insuﬃcient maintenance as follows:
p AH p AH p AH( 1)= ( 2)= ( 3) = 1/3, (13)
However, in light of new evidences these weights and probabilities
may be easily updated in the models.
4. Validation of the models
This section shows the results of validation framework applied to
the models described in the earlier sections. The validation framework
assesses the plausibility of the model as a tool for serving its envisaged
functions: (i) to convey an argumentation based on available evidence,
(ii) to discriminate diﬀerent ship designs.
4.1. Translation validity
4.1.1. Face validity
The face validity of the models is drawn from the evidence base that
drove the development of the model. The major components that make
up the model of the attention management mechanism and were
derived from the literature, as described earlier in this paper.
The input node thresholds for eﬀect on human performance were
derived from the literature, however the probabilities were set by a
combination of expert judgement and human reliability assessment
(HRA) methods. The NARA guidelines selected is evidence-based to
the extent it utilises the CORE-DATA set to set basic human error
probabilities that are derived from real-world human reliability data.
However, signiﬁcant expert judgement is required to select which
factors are appropriate for the context and to determine the magnitude
of their eﬀect on human performance in the context. Despite the
adoption of HRA methods in a number of domains (e.g. nuclear, oil &
gas), these subjective judgements required by the method remain
subject to potential inter-rater variability.
There are very few models inhabiting the modelling space presented
here, hence it is diﬃcult to elaborate on their consistency with the
parameters of these models. Some elements existing in the models
Table 5
The probabilities of collision and grounding obtained in the course of extreme conditions
tests.
The probability of collision The probability of grounding
An
absolut
value
Change
compared to
the baseline
An
absolut
value
Change
compared to
the baseline
All active 1,38E−06 +10% 3,58E−04 +16%
Base line 1,26E−06 – 3,06E−04 –
All inactive 7,01E−07 −45% 2,11E−04 −31%
Table 6
The results of comparison of two nomologically proximate models.
DNV model The models
presented here
States of selected nodes in
the risk models
Prob. of
collision
Relative
change
Prob. of
collision
Relative
change
Increase performance
performance=excellent/
AMC= normal
8,1E−06 −5% 1,0E−06 −20%
Base line 8,60E−06 0 1,26E−06 0
Deteriorate performance
performance=poor/
AMC=degraded
9,5E−06 +10% 1,4E−06 +11%
Table 7
The summary of validity tests.
Validity criteria Score
Face High
Content Moderate
Predictive Moderate-High
Concurrent Moderate
3 In [72] the probability of a technical failure in a critical situation, yields 4.5E−6,
based on accident statistics. In [73] the probability of technical failure per hour of ship
operation, elicited from the experts yields 3E−4.
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correspond to the expert driven risk models for collision and grounding
presented in the literature. Structurally, the concept of degraded and
normal attention and resulted human behaviour are the aspects the
models have in common with a model proposed by DNV, [13,74].
However, the relationship of the attention management construct to
other elements in the model is unique to the models presented here.
Overall, the face validity of the models presented here is high.
4.1.2. Content validity
The development of the models was based on scientiﬁc literature as
far as possible. The pre-selected GDFs of ship motion, noise, WBV are a
subset of the potential performing-shaping factors that could inﬂuence
the outcomes of collision or grounding. Other factors can be imagined
that are inﬂuenced by vessel design, which have a greater impact on
human performance, however the three types of GDFs were chosen
arbitrarily.
The states for the GDF input variables of ship motion, noise and
vibration were derived from the literature around thresholds of eﬀect
that, despite incomplete data, can be justiﬁed with some caveats.
Other states for nodes within the model represent a simpliﬁcation
due to incomplete knowledge (attention management being repre-
sented by only two states: normal or degraded), or to perform a
function within the model (switching GDF stressor eﬀects and GDF
physical eﬀects on or oﬀ). These binary nodes are understood to have
low content validity.
Nodes outside the GDF input variables fail the test of dimensional
consistency as they do reﬂect states either above or below a level, but
cannot be set at the level itself. Hence these reduce the content validity
of the model.
The presented models are developed to the limits of the relevant
literature and expert knowledge. The integration of HRA is relevant
here. Despite HRAs general limitations as a method in terms of
reliability and its application here being outside its normal use, it
was necessary as a means to generate probabilistic bounds for the
nodes within the risk model.
Overall, the content validity of the models is moderate, being
compromised by the limitations imposed by the limited scientiﬁc
knowledge in the domain.
4.2. Criterion related validity
4.2.1. Concurrent validity
Concurrent validity (CV) is tested in two-fold. First, by comparing
the elements of the models with another model developed for a similar
purpose. Second by comparing the models with the trends existing in
the results from the experiments, which were designed for this speciﬁc
purpose, conducted with the use of full mission bridge simulator as
reported in [75].
The former is complicated, since there is no other model that would
link the GDFs with the human task performance. The external models
that were used for this validation exercises, were developed for speciﬁc
purposes, which substantially diﬀer from the purpose of the models
presented here. Therefore, the inter-models comparison is feasible only
with respect to selected elements of the models.
For instance, the elements describing human behaviour in a given
situation can be compared with respect to the paradigms governing
these, discretization level adopted or input-output relation. In some
case qualitative comparison is feasible; in other quantitative evaluation
is the only option.
There are several models that can be deemed relevant for this step
of validation, for example [5,6,76–78]. However only one by DNV, is
found suitable for the concurrent validity, [13,74].
4.2.1.1. Comparison with other relevant models. A model by DNV
estimates the probability of collision, accounting for the navigational
parameters, safety culture, personnel factors, management factors,
technical reliability and other vigilance. The model assumes the
failure of a navigator along the path of detection-assessment-action
for an accident to happen. As a modelling technique BBN is adopted
and experts’ judgment is used as a primary source of information to
parameterize the model. The model was developed to measure the
eﬀects of bridge layout on the collision and grounding probability
through the estimation of performance of a navigator. The performance
aﬀects the causal path of: detection, assessment and action, moreover,
the probability of technical failure of ship machinery is accounted for,
likewise in the models described here.
Looking into the core of DNV model, where the eﬀect of stressors
on the performance of a navigator is estimated, we can say that our
models and the DNV model can be compared at a generic level. The
basic causal relations: stressor – attention of a person – detection –
assessment – action is retained in both models, the logic behind their
structure can be seen as similar.
The structure of our models is based on the concept of Attention
Management and the parameters are found through the HRA methods
and experts’ judgments. The DNV model to a large extent is based on
experts’ judgment and historical data, therefore the structure and
parameters of these two models can hardly be comparable.
Despite that diﬀerence, the validity of our models shall not be seen
compromised. Since the purposes of the two compared models are
substantially diﬀerent, their input nodes and CPTs are not expected to
match fully.
4.2.1.2. Comparison with simulator studies. By comparing the eﬀect
of GDFs on the performance of a navigator with the results obtained
from experiments with the use of full mission ship bridge simulator,
one can evaluate the level of concurrent validity of the relevant parts of
the models. The results of simulator studies conducted for the purpose
of validating the models shown here are reported in [75]. The
performance of a navigator is measured in two-fold for each
simulation run. First, two navigation measures are evaluated, i.e.
normalised distance to the relevant target ship, and normalised track
deviation. Second the instructor ratings on the rapidity/quality of
mariners’ responses are recorded. The studies account for the eﬀect of
noise on human performance. Due to technical limitations of the
simulator the eﬀect of motion and vibration could not be realistically
modelled.
In the report authors claim that there are no signiﬁcant eﬀects of
noise or task diﬃculty on either of the navigation measures. However,
when the instructors’ ratings of the rapidity/quality of mariners’
responses are considered, a number of signiﬁcant or marginally
signiﬁcant eﬀects of noise and task diﬃculty emerge. The overall,
global ratings of task performance by instructors showed both a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of task diﬃculty (which validated the task diﬃculty
manipulation within the experiment) and a signiﬁcant eﬀect of noise
such that higher levels of noise were associated with poorer perfor-
mance. The eﬀects of noise were also either signiﬁcant, or close to
statistical signiﬁcance, in the case of several speciﬁc actions within high
diﬃculty scenarios.
This ﬁnding suggests that there might be an interaction between
noise and task diﬃculty such that noise has little or no eﬀect in
situations where the task is easier, but might lead to impaired
performance of a high diﬃculty task. These ﬁndings support, to some
J. Montewka et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 159 (2017) 283–300
293
extent, the modelling choices adopted here.
The overall concurrent validity of the risk model can be judged as
moderate.
4.2.2. Predictive validity
Extreme conditions test is a case of predictive validity testing where
the hypothetical model is set to extreme conditions where the
behaviour of the model is more predictable, [79]. The results of these
tests are presented in Table 5, where the measure of human perfor-
mance is tabulated, expressed as the probabilities of collision and
grounding. The results are shown for three diﬀerent states of input
variables. The base line refers to the input variables being in their
states reﬂecting the average conditions on board ships. The all-active
state refers to a situation where all the stressors are active and are
aﬀecting negatively the performance of a navigator. The all-inactive
state refers to the situation where there is no stressor acting on a
navigator.
4.2.2.1. Comparison of the results obtained from the models being in
nomological proximity. There is only one model that is nomologicaly
close to the model presented here, namely DNV risk model, **[13,74].
The proximity of these two models comes from the fact, that both
measure the eﬀect of performance shaping factors (PSFs) on the ability
of a navigator to perform his main tasks in relation to safe navigation
and collision avoidance action. However, the PSFs that each model
takes into account are diﬀerent, likewise the mechanisms governing
that ability. In the model presented here navigator's ability is governed
by the attention management capability, which is modelled by a
variable of the same name. In DNV model this ability is modelled
through a set of variables, where the one called performance seems to
be the most comparable with the attention management in our model.
Therefore, the eﬀect of manipulation of these two variables on the
explanatory variable is measured. The results of this test are presented
in Table 6, where the probabilities of collision associated with the
various states of the analysed variables are shown.
It is evident, that the behaviour of both models is comparable, when
changing the states of the variables of interests between their states. In
our model the variable Attention Management Capabilities has two
states (Normal, Degraded), however in DNV model the variable
Performance has four states (Excellent, Standard, Poor, Not able to
perform). For comparison we took Performance=Excellent and
Performance=Poor, these refer to Normal and Degraded attention
management capability (AMC).
On the basis of the obtained scores of the validity criteria presented
in Table 7, the overall predictive validity of the risk model can be
judged as between moderate and high with the following observations:
• Moderate content validity informs that there is room for improve-
ment when it comes to the parametrization of the models. This
stems mainly form the lack of data about the analysed phenomena.
In order to increase the score in this validation test, an extensive
research is needed dedicated solely to the assessment of the eﬀect of
GDFs on performance of a crew member.
• Moderate concurrent validity reﬂects the actual state of the art in the
analysed ﬁeld. Due to lack of compatibility between the existing
models and these presented here the direct comparison of these is
not feasible. In some cases only elements of the models can be
compared, but event then due to substantially diﬀerent modelling
paradigm behind the models the results of comparison are not
satisfactory.
• Moderate – High predictive validity shows that the models devel-
oped behave as expected when tested. This means that the model
ranks the designs appropriately for diﬀerent GDF levels. In practice
it means, that the exact numbers that the models provide may not be
“correct” but the proper behaviour of the models means they can be
used to distinguish diﬀerent designs in a multi-objective optimiza-
tion, which is the primary aim of the models.
• Also the sensitivity-uncertainty assessment allowed deﬁning the
most critical elements of the models and remedial actions were
taken to improve the overall performance of the model. These
comprise the alternative hypothesis with respect to the most critical
element. This high score supports the adopted modelling techni-
ques, which make it possible to carry out an extensive tests
pertaining to the predictive validity.
5. Conclusion
This paper oﬀers two novel models linking the eﬀect of GDFs with
human performance, which can be incorporated into a process of
multi-objective ship design. Within the models the GDFs can be
appropriately modiﬁed at the early stage of ship design process
resulting in a design characterised by the highest performance of a
human. All other factors aﬀecting the human performance, but not
belonging to this particular aspect of ship design, are omitted in the
model (they are considered constant in all analysed design alternatives,
thus having the same eﬀect across designs).
The primary aim of the framework is to allow diﬀerentiation among
various designs based on the criteria selected, which is human
performance in safety critical tasks pertaining to accident avoidance.
The results of validation process adopted here show that the presented
models are valid for the given purpose, despite certain limitations and
the paucity in data. These gaps in background knowledge lower the
level of accuracy of the models, thus the models shall not be used to
seek an accurate estimates of the measure of human performance (the
probability of an accident). Instead the models can be used for the
relative comparison of designs, which is aﬀected to much lesser extent
by the gaps in background knowledge.
The models may be used by naval architects, vessel designers, and
vessel system designers as intended, provided access to Human Factor
(HF) expertise is available to assist with application and interpretation.
It is important to recognise the relevance of human factors input
during its eventual application. HF provides the understanding of the
complexities of human behaviour in operational settings, its interde-
pendencies and interactions.
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APPENDIX A. Quantiﬁcation of the GDFs and their eﬀect on human capabilities
(See Tables A8–A20).
Table A8
Probability table of the node Motion_Z_Axis_Heave – Hz.
Motion Z Axis – frequency (Hz) Probability
Below 0.5 0.25
Between 0.5–0.7 0.25
Between 0.7–0.85 0.25
Above 0.85 0.25
Table A9
Probability table of the node Motion_Z_Axis_Heave – RMSg.
Motion Z Axis - acceleration (RMSg) Probability
Below 0.1 0.25
Between 0.1–0.15 0.25
Between 0.15–0.2 0.25
Above 0.2 0.25
Table A10
Probability table of the node Motion - Lateral Acceleration.
Motion - lateral acceleration (RMS g) Probability
Below 0.12 0.34
Between 0.12–0.25 0.33
Above 0.25 0.33
Table A11
Probability table of the node Vibration and Vibration 2.
Vibration –WBV (Hz) Probability
Below 2 0.167
Between 2–4 0.167
Between 4–11 0.167
Between 11–20 0.167
Between 20–80 0.167
Above 80 0.165
Table A12
Probability table of the node Noise and Noise 2.
Noise (dB) Probability
Below 30 0.2
Between 30–55 0.2
Between 55–75 0.2
Between 75–90 0.2
Above 90 0.2
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Table A13
Probability table of the node Diffuse Motion (MIS) and Diffuse Motion 2 (MIS_2) (Parent nodes for the former: Motion_Z_Axis_RMSg and Motion_Z_Axis_Hz; Parent nodes for the
latter: Motion_Z_Axis_RMSg 2 and Motion_Z_Axis_Hz 2).
Diﬀuse Motion (MIS) Probability
Motion_Z_Axis_RMSg Heave_L01g Heave_01_015 g
Motion_Z_Axis_Hz Heave_L05hz Heave_05_07hz Heave_07_085hz Heave_M085 Heave_L05hz Heave_05_07hz Heave_07_085hz Heave_M085
Above_Level 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Below_Level 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Diﬀuse Motion (MIS) Probability
Motion_Z_Axis_RMSg Heave_015_02g Heave_M02g
Motion_Z_Axis_Hz Heave_L05hz Heave_05_07hz Heave_07_085hz Heave_M085 Heave_L05hz Heave_05_07hz Heave_07_085hz Heave_M085
Above_Level 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Below_Level 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table A14
Probability table of the node Acute Motion (MII) (Parent node: Motion - Lateral Acceleration).
Acute Motion (MII) Probability
Motion - Lateral
Acceleration
Lat_Acc_L012 Lat_Acc_012_025 Lat_Acc_M025
Above_Level 0 0.67 1
Below_Level 1 0.33 0
Table A15
Probability table of the node Diffuse Vibration and Diffuse Vibration 2 (Parent node for the former: Vibration; parent node for the latter: Vibration 2).
Diﬀuse Vibration Probability
Vibration V_below_2hz V_2_4hz V_4_11hz V_11_20hz V_20_80hz V_80_plus_hz
Above_Level 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Below_Level 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Table A16
Probability table of the node Acute Vibration (Parent node: Vibration).
Acute Vibration Probability
Vibration V_below_2hz V_2_4hz V_4_11hz V_11_20hz V_20_80hz V_80_plus_hz
Above_Level 0 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.1 0
Below_Level 1 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.9 1
Table A17
Probability table of the node Diffuse Noise and Diffuse Noise 2 (Parent node for the former: Noise; parent node for the latter: Noise 2).
Diﬀuse Noise Probability
Noise s_L30dB s_30_55dB s_55_75dB s_75_90dB s_M90dB
Above_Level 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.5 0.5
Below_Level 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.5 0.5
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APPENDIX B. Quantiﬁcation of the human behaviour in the presence of GDFs
(See Tables B21–B28).
Table A19
Probability table of the node GDF stressor and GDF stressor technical (Parent nodes for the former: Diﬀuse Motion (MIS), Diﬀuse Vibration, Diﬀuse Noise and Acute Noise; parent
nodes for the latter: Diﬀuse Motion 2 (MIS_2), Diﬀuse Vibration 2, Diﬀuse Noise 2 and Acute Noise 2).
GDF stressor Probability
Diﬀuse Motion (MIS) Above_Level
Diﬀuse Vibration Above_Level Below_Level
Diﬀuse Noise Above_Level Below_Level Above_Level Below_Level
Acute Noise Above Level Below Level Above Level Below Level Above Level Below Level Above Level Below Level
Active 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Inactive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDF stressor Probability
Diﬀuse Motion (MIS) Below_Level
Diﬀuse Vibration Above_Level Below_Level
Diﬀuse Noise Above_Level Below_Level Above_Level Below_Level
Acute Noise Above Level Below Level Above Level Below Level Above Level Below Level Above Level Below Level
Active 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Inactive 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table A20
Probability table of the node GDF Physical effect (Parent nodes: Acute Vibration and Acute Motion (MII)).
GDF Physical
eﬀect
Probability
Acute Vibration Above_Level Below_Level
Acute Motion (MII) Above_Level Below_Level Above_Level Below_Level
Yes 1 1 1 0
No 0 0 0 1
Table B21
The conditional probability table of the node C1-Detection, Assessment and Execution of simple action (Parent nodes: Helmsman Present, Attention Management Capability, GDF
Physical Eﬀect).
C1-Detection, Assessment and Execution of simple action (DAAct) Probability
Helmsman present Yes No
Attention Management Capability Normal Degraded Normal Degraded
GDF Physical Eﬀect Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
C1 performed 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.999 0.9995 0.9989 0.9994
C1 not performed 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.001 0.0005 0.0011 0.0006
Table A18
Probability table of the node Acute Noise and Acute Noise 2 (Parent node for the former: Noise; parent node for the latter: Noise 2).
Acute Noise Probability
Noise s_L30dB s_30_55 dB s_55_75 dB s_75_90 dB s_M90dB
Above_Level 0 0 0.5 0.8 1
Below_Level 1 1 0.5 0.2 0
J. Montewka et al. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 159 (2017) 283–300
297
Table B22
The conditional probability table of the node D1 – Verbal Communication on Safety Critical Data (Parent nodes: Attention Management Capability, C1-Detection, Assessment and
Execution of simple action).
D1-Verbal
Communication
On Safety Critical
Data
Probability
Attention
Management
Capability
Normal (z1) Degraded (z0)
C1-Detection,
Assessment and
Execution of simple
action
C1 performed C1 not
performed
C1 performed C1 not
performed
D1 performed 0.994 0 0.9928 0
D1 not performed 0.006 1 0.0072 1
Table B23
The conditional probability table of the node Evasive Action (Parent nodes: Helmsman Present, C1-Detection, Assessment and Execution of simple action, D1 – Verbal Communication
on Safety Critical Data).
Evasive Action Probability
Helmsman present Yes No
C1-Detection, Assessment and
Execution of simple action
C1 performed (1) C1 not performed (0) C1 performed C1 not performed
Attention Management Capability Normal Degraded Normal Degraded
D1-Verbal Communication On
Safety Critical Data
D1 Performed D1 Not
Performed
D1 Performed D1 Not
Performed
D1 Performed D1 Not
Performed
D1 Performed D1 Not
Performed
Evasive action executed 1 0.9 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 0
Evasive action not executed 0 0.1 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 1
Table B24
Probability table of the node Technical Failure (Parent node: Maintenance Task Performance).
Technical Failure Probability
Maintenance Task Performance (MTP) Suﬃcient Insuﬃcient
No 1 0
Yes 0 1
Table B25
Probability table of the node Maintenance Task Performance (Parent node: Attention Management Capability 2).
Maintenance Task Performance Probability
Attention Management Capability 2 Normal (z1) Degraded (z0)
Suﬃcient (m1) 0.9995 0.9994
Insuﬃcient (m0) 0.0005 0.0006
Table B26
The conditional probability table of the node Collision (Parent nodes: Evasive Action of Another Ship, Evasive Action, Technical Failure).
Collision Probability
Evasive Action of
Another Ship
Yes No
Evasive Action Executed Not Executed Executed Not Executed
Technical Failure No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Collision - yes 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Collision - no 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
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